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MAY A PERSON BE CONVICTED OF A FELONY
AND YET ESCAPE CIVIL LIABILITY THEREFOR?
W B. RUBIN*
T D THE query suggested in the title, offhandedly one would an-
swer "no."
Yet the Supreme Court's decision in Clemens v. State,, creates the
paradox. Clemens was convicted of violating the manslaughter statute
Every other killing of a human being by the act, procurement or
culpable negligence of another, where such killing is not justifiable or
excusable, or is not declared in this chapter murder or manslaughter
of some other degree, shall be deemed manslaughter in the fourth
degree."'2
The trial court found as a matter of law that Clemens was guilty of
but ordinary negligenceoand not gross or wilful negligence, that there
was a total absence of a criminal intent, or of any intent of wilful or
gross negligence whatever; that whatever Clemens did was the result
of mere inadvertence to observe a statutory requirement when his auto-
mobile ran into another automobile, colliding therewith and causing the
death of the person in the other automobile, and that such death was the
result of accident and misfortune.
The court, through Doerfler, J., made the following observation
The busy lawyer, under the law as we have now construed it, whose
mind during the day has been absorbed in the consideration of the intri-
cate problems that have been presented to him in the course of his
professional activities during the day, and who by reason thereof is
unable wholly to relieve himself of his absorbing thoughts, who, in an
effort to regain a well-deserved relaxation at the end of his day's labor,
in taking out his family for an automobile ride, exceeds the prescribed
speed limit in the slightest degree, and as the result thereof a collision
takes place which unfortunately causes the death of a human being, will
be subject to a homicidal charge and a conviction thereof, which not
only will be ruinous to his own happiness and welfare, but reflect sen-
* Member of the Milwaukee Bar.
176 Wis. 289, 185 N.W 209.
' Sec. 4363 Wis. Stats.
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ously upon the members of his family The laborer employed in the
construction of a large building, who while absorbed in the performance
of his duties, or whose mind may incidentally be engaged in pondering
over serious matters of domestic trouble and difficulty, inadvertently
may drop some tool or an article of building material, as the result of
which a human life may be lost. The result is that he has changed his
status from a law-abiding citizen to that of a felon, and if he be en-
dowed with the conscientious regard and appreciation which all good
citizens should possess, namely, that of retaining his good name and
reputation in the community where he resides, he must be keenly af-
fected by the results wrought and the consequence of what can be
termed nothing more than his misfortune. While the freedom from
physical injury and the full possession of our physical and mental
powers are most desirable, and while life itself is one of the dearest
possessions with which man is blessed, the true citizen esteems his good
name and his reputation of infinitely greater importance than either
life or limb.
We have indulged in these comments merely to make it clear that we
are not heartily in accord with the purport of the manslaughter statute
in question, with the thought that at the earliest time available such
changes be made in the statutes of our state by the legislature as will
require, in order to convict of manslaughter in the fourth degree, gross
negligence as defined in the decisions of this court, or that provision be
made so that no one will come within the condemnation of this statute
unless he is guilty of an act in violation of some penal law, as the result
whereof human life is taken.
The legislature has not yet amended the section and we think the
court was in error when it made a human act without an element of
criminal intent and for which one may escape civil liability, a felony,
and to prove that point is the purpose of this article.
The decisions quoted in the Clemens Case, with the exception of the
Missouri Case, are civil cases.
The textbooks on criminal law cited in the Missouri cases uphold the
contention we make that the intent is a necessary ingredient of the
offense of manslaughter. True, the intent may be inferred from the
surrounding facts and circumstances, but it must be there. The defini-
tion of culpable negligence is, therefore, correct and in a civil case makes
the liability complete. But in a criminal case under the requirements
of what constitutes excusable homicide the jury is obliged to find the
"unlawful intent" before it can say there is no excusable homicide.
In the Horner Case,' the court declared that under the act of 1911,
before a person may escape civil liability, he is obliged to prove that he
exercised "the highest degree of care." But in a criminal case he need
only show that "he exercised ordinary care." The conviction was re-
versed because the trial judge had charged the jury that "the highest
'State v. Horner, (Mo.) i8o S.W 873.
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degree of care" was necessary The Missouri cases cited do not pass
upon the "unlawful intent" in the "excusable homicide" statute, and
therefore it must be presumed that the correct instruction was given
with reference to an unlawful intent as in said statute.
In the Coulter Case4 there was a reversal of conviction because, al-
though the court gave the correct instruction on what constitutes crimi-
nal or culpable negligence, the court charged the jury in that con-
nection that any act of negligence whereby one party directly brings
about the death of another human being, is an act of culpable negligence
of law.
Surely there can be no negligence less than ordinary negligence.
Slight negligence is ordinary negligence particular to a given situation,
therefore, in the light of" the Missouri statute on excusable homicide,
the negligence alone is not sufficient to convict but there must be a
negativing of all the saving provisions in the excusable homicide statute
which includes the unlawfur intent.
If a man inadvertently, without unlawful intent, drop a jackknife,
he is not guilty. But though he use due care, yet with an unlawful
intent drop such knife, and the unlawful intent consists of a knowledge,
yet a constructive knowledge, that people are beneath him and that
mischief may ensue, there is the crime.
Again, at the time the Horner Case (supra) was tried, it was based
on Section 4468 of its Statutes (Mo.).
Every other killing of a human being by the culpable negligence
of another which would be manslaughter at the common law, and which
is not excusable and justifiable, or is not declared in this chapter to be
manslaughter in some other degree, shall be deemed manslaughter in the
fourth degree.
Now manslaughter at common law consists of the culpable negligence
plus the unlawful intent or the converse, excusable homicide is not
a defense unless what was done was without the unlawful intent.
Since then Missouri has abolished its common law manslaughter, and,
as Justice Doerfler says in his opinion, it has but one degree of man-
slaughter.
Every killing of a human being by the act, procurement or culpable
negligence of another not herein declared to be murder or excusable orjustifiable homicide, shall be deemed manslaughter5
If that be so, and manslaughter certainly may have other elements in
it besides culpable negligence, they are cared for in some way in that
state, other than manslaughter, and what constitutes manslaughter in
'State v. Coulter, (Mo.) 204 S.W 5.
Sec. 3236, Mo. Stat.
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the first, second and third degrees in this state, all of which were com-
mon law manslaughter, has been taken out of the manslaughter statute
in Missouri.
And as we shall see later, the excusable homicide took out of the
common law definition of manslaughter the unlawful intent when it
was codified and subdivided into the several degrees, and placed the
"unlawful intent" into the excusable honzcide statute.
We compare Section 3236 of the Missouri Statute with our Statute
Section 4365.
The word culpable is omitted in our Statute.
Again compare Section 3236 of Missouri Statutes with our Section
4363. And also compare Missouri Section 4468, now abolished, with
the foregoing Section 4363.
Section 4365 R. S. expressly defines homicide and manslaughter and
it differs from the Missouri Statute. The act may be excusable homi-
cide, the omission may be excusable homicide.
The rule of construction of a penal statute is to be resolved in favor
of the person accused, and stnct construction requires that where a
word is capable of more than one meaning the one most favorable to
the accused shall be given, providing that no violence shall be done
to the natural meaning of the word.
It is a most fundamental canon of criminal legislation that a law
which takes a man's property or liberty as a penalty for an offense must
so clearly define the acts upon which the penalty is denounced that no
ordinary person can fail to understand his duty and the departure
therefrom which the law attempts to make criminal."
Not only is the degree of proof necessary to sustain a conviction
greater than that required to maintain a civil cause of action, but also
the degree of construction of words and statutes is necessarily greater.
A short history of the law of homicide and its origin not only is inter-
esting but fully in support of our contention.
Common law punishments are abolished in this state.7
But common law offenses have not been abolished-merely codified-
and the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors, notwithstanding
Section 4637 R. S., still exists as it did in the common law 8
Felonies import criminal intent.
It is the actual knowledge that constitutes that element of guilt, and
not mere negligence in failing to know There cannot be a crime with-
out criminal intentY
'Nelson v. State, iii Wis. 394-399, 87 N.W 235.
See also Broun v. State, i37 Wis. 543-548, iig N.W 338.
Pulp Wood Co. v. Green Bay P & F Co., 157 Wis. 6o4-6i8, 147 N.W IO58.
Sec. 4634 R.S. Wis. Stat.
Wison v. State, i Wis. I63-i69.
'State v. Wezs,,ian, (Mo) 225 S.W 949-950.
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And the Nebraska court adds
Specific Intent Implied. The word "feloniously" imports only that
criminal intent which is the necessary part of every felony, or other
crime, but they do not necessarily include the specific "purpose" to do
the act which is an element of the crime charged.
Whether the indictment is on a statute or at the common law, it is a
rule universal and without exception that-every intent, like everything
else, which the law makes an element of the offense must be alleged,
for otherwise no prima facie case appears."0
The information in the Clemens Case charged that the defendant did
feloniously kill and slay They are the essential.parts to the sufficiency
of the information."
Therefore, whatever rule there may be in Missouri or elsewhere, be-
fore a conviction can be had of manslaughter in this state, the slaying
and killing must be charged and proved felonious.
At common law, homicide was divided into murder and manslaughter
without any reference to degrees, and the Statutes of the Territory of
Wisconsin, 1839, under an act "to provide for the punishment of of-
fenses against the lives and persons of individuals" in Section 8 thereof,
on page 348, provides
That every person who shall commit the crime of manslaughter shall
be punished by imprisonment in the state prison, not more than ten
years nor less than one year.
And what was either justifiable or excusable homicide was left to
the common law, there being no statutory provision thereon.
After the admission of Wisconsin to the Union, by Chapter 133, R. S.
Laws of 1849, not only did the legislature divide murder into three de-
grees, but it also divided manslaughter into four degrees, Section 21
corresponding to Section 4363 under which Clemens was prosecuted,
and the language is identical.
The revised statutes did not create manslaughter a crime, it existed
as such before. True, the revised statutes arrange the crime of
manslaughter into degrees, but this amounts to nothing more than giv-
ing the jury an additional duty, and relieving the court from a duty
that before devolved upon it. The grade is to be gathered from the
facts of the case canvassed by the jury 12
And that the statute is not a rule of pleading, but a guide to the con-
duct of the trial and to the instructions to be given to the jury:"
Section 6 of Chapter 133 of the revised statutes of 1849 (which is in
the very language of section 4367) is in effect an innovation upon the
"Newby v. State, 75 Neb. 33, lO5 N.W lO99-11oo.
Words and Phrases, Vol. 2, p. 537.
"Sec. 466o, Wis. Stat.
'Keene v. State, 3 Pinney 99.
"Hogan v. State, 30 Wis. 428.
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common law, not merely in its codification, but particularly in its sepa-
ration and division from section 4366. And the term "without unlawful
intent" in section 4367, becomes, therefore, most significant.
At common law, justifiable homicide existed only when the killing
occurred at the command of the king. All other homicides were either
felonious or excusable.
In these instances of justifiable homicide, it may be observed, that
the slayer is in no kind of fault whatsoever, not even in the minutest
degree, and is therefore to be totally acquitted and discharged, with
commendation rather than blame. But that is not quite the case in
excusable homicide, the very name whereof imports some fault, some
error or omission, so trivial, however, that the law excuses it from the
guilt of felony, though, in strictness, it judges it deserving of some little
degree of punishment.1 4
And excusable homicide is there divided either per infortunsum, by
misadventure, or se defendendo-self-defense.15
The common law derives its doctrine of punishment and the defenses
thereto from the Mosaic Code, and while Blackstone makes reference
to the Roman Code, it will be seen that the Mosaic Code as later devel-
oped by the ancient rabbis and influenced by the philosophy of Christ,
found its way in the formation of the common law, applicable to homi-
cide.
Under the Mosaic Code, the overt act itself constituted the offense,
and neither the law of justifiable nor excusable homicide existed, not
even where a father accidentally killed his own son. If the homicide
was wilful, death was the punishment. If it was accidental, he was
exiled to one of the six cities of refuge, and the liberal construction
placed upon the Mosaic Code which later developed the defense of ex-
cusable homicide came long after the year A.D. I.
The Christian doctrine, as enunciated by the Nazarene, punished the
intent as the crime. The act itself was of inconsequence.
The common law developed its code of crime and punishment out of
the two concepts, i.e., that there must be an overt act as demanded in
the Mosaic Code, plus the intent, the controlling element in the teach-
ings of Christ.
The laws of the Old Testament are found in Genesis, Exodus, Leviti-
cus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy
Exodus 2I :12-He that smiteth a man, so that he die, shall be surely
put to death.
Exodus 2I :13-And if a man lie not in wait. but God deliver him
unto his hand, then I will appoint thee a place whither he shall flee.
"2 Cooley's Blackstone 46.
z2 Cooley's Blackstone 407
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And we shall see later, the Jewish Code evolved that the killing of a
person under command of authority was neither the subject of death
nor exile.
Exodus 22:2-If a thief be found breaking up, and be smitten that
he die, there shall be no blood be shed for him.
This was the cause of much polemics as to whether the act was
justifiable homicide in the sense that there should be no punishment
whatever, or whether the perpetrator should be sent to exile. But later
developments, both in the Mosaic Code, the Roman Code, and the
common law, put this one exception into the category of justifiable
homicide, equalling it with the killing under the King's command. All
other killings were excusable.
Leviticus 24:I7-And he that killeth any man shall surely be put to
death.
Leviticus 24:20-21.
All of which- reaffirm the quotation from Exodus.
Numbers 35:i i-Then ye shall appoint you cities to be cities of
refuge for you, that the slayer may flee thither, which killeth any person
unawares.
Numbers 35 :15-These six cities shall* be a refuge, both for the
children of Israel, and for the stranger, and for the sojourner among
them, that every one that killeth any person unawares may flee thither.
The next from Numbers give instances of murder.
Nhmbers 35 :i6-And if he smite him with an instrument of iron,
so that he die, he is a murderer, the murderer shall surely be put to
death.
Numbers 35 :I7-And if he smite him with throwing a stone, where-
with he may die, and he die, he is a murderer, the murderer shall surely
be put to death.
Numbers 35 :i8-Or if he smite him with a hand weapon of wood,
wherewith he may die, and he die, he is a murderer, the murderer shall
surely be put to death.
Numbers 35:19-21.
While the.next, also from Numbers,, gives instances of commitment
to a City of Refuge
Numbers 35:22-But if he trust him, suddenly without enmity, or
have cast upon him anything without laying of wait.
Numbers 35:23-25.
Deuteronomy 19-5 gives us this
As when a man goeth into the wood with his neighbor to hew wood,
and his hand fetched a stroke with the axe to cut down the tree, and
the head slippeth from the helve, and lighteth upon his neighbor that he
die, he shall flee unto one of those cities, and live.
119
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THE CONCEPT OF JESUS
Passing to Matthew 5 -38 we find
Ye have heard that it hath been said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth
for a tooth, [and Matthew 5 -39] But I say unto you, That ye resist not




Matthew 6.I4-For if ye forgive men their trespasses, your Heavenly
Father will also forgive you.
Luke 6:29--And unto him that smiteth thee on the one cheek offer
also the other, and him that taketh away thy cloak forbid not to take thy
coat also.
Matthew 5:28-But I say unto you, That whosoever looketh on a
woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in
his heart.
Thus it may be seen from the entire reading of the New Testament
that while the last quotation is with reference to the crime of adultery
the intent really was the essence of every offense, the overt act being
regarded as merely -descriptive of the offense, A shortcoming in con-
duct was measured not by the gravity or its consequences, and the act
as well as its expiation was measured only by the intent with which it
was committed, and by the intent of the expiation invoked.







It defines "accidental homicide" as being "when it is the effect of
constructive negligence but entirely free from felonious intention."
Homicide is defined as being "culpable" when it is "the result of
actual negligence on the part of the perpetrator."
And so plentiful did the polemics become that, with an adroitness that
equals, if not excels, that of Plato, Sophocles, and other Greek scho-
lastics, they even draw a distinction between excusable homicide, as
when a person is ascending a ladder and the material drops and causes
the killing ot some one passing by, an inexcusable homicide when the
same fatality is caused when a person is descending a ladder.' 7
" See The Jewish Encyclopedia, Vol. 6, p. 452.
17 Considerable discussion of that can be found in the Babylonian Talmud
(Rodkinson),. English Edition, Volume 9-Subject, Jurisprudence, Chapter 2.
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The Roman Code is not very specific in its treatment of crimes, be-
cause it is usually left to the body exercising criminal jurisdiction, bound
by no rules of law as to the nature of the delict or its punishment, and
in Sanders' Justmian, American Edition, pages 493-95, it speaks merely
of a wrongful killing, without any right, and of those without fault.
In only one instance under the Roman Law was a design without an
overt act sufficient to sustain an offense, and that was lex Julia Males-
tabs.1 8
So that in turning to 2 Cooley's Blackstone (Book IV, page 182),
and reading his discussion of excusable homicide, one attains some
degree of understanding of the reasons for the doctrine, and that is
why the doctrine of excusable homicide was extended to exempt from
punishment though some fault is involved. It may be mere negligence,
a fault which, according to the dictionary, means "a slight crime or
offense, blemish, defect, omission." And if an omission or neglect
or fault was not within the humane exemption of excusable homicide,
then we would be relegated to the ancient doctrine of the pre-common
law-of punishment for the overt act alone, regardless of the intention.
And may we be pardoned for saying that that is where the Clemens
opinion leaves us ? It excuses no omission of any kind, however un-
intentional, or accidental or unfortunate.
On page 182 of Cooley's Blackstone, Vol. 2 (Book IV), a case is
cited where a person who whips a horse of another and death ensues
(the horse having run over a child), he might be held for manslaughter,
because the act was a trespass, and at best a piece of idleness, of in-
evitably dangerous consequences.
On page 183 "If death ensues in consequence of an idle, dangerous,
and unlawful sport-the slayer is guilty of manslaughter" because they
are unlawful acts.
On page 18, Chapter II, Cooley's Blackstone, Volume 2, Book IV
Indeed, to make a complete crime cognizable by human laws, there
must be both a z4ll and an act.
And a liftle further on, after a discussion that the will to do an
unlawful act alone cannot be punished-
To constitute a crime against human laws, there must be, first, a
vicious will, and secondly, an unlawful act consequent upon such
vicious will.
On page 21,
Where there is understanding and will sufficient, residing in the
party, but not called for and exerted at the time of the action done,
"See Sanders Tustimnn, American edition, page 588.
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which is the case of all offenses committed by CHANCE or ignorance.
Here the will sits neuter, and neither concurs with the act, nor dis-
agrees to it.
At common law, murder was established by malice, express or im-
plied. Express malice is essential to murder in the first degree. Man-
slaughter has all the elements of murder except that it omits malice. 9
Section 4363 R. S. is, therefore, a common law manslaughter only
in its lowest degree, and when on turning to section 4367 R. S., it is
fou-d that before it can be excusable, there must be an absence of un-
lawful intent. If mere negligence, therefore, an omission and want of
ordinary care is sufficient to constitute manslaughter in the fourth
degree-and ordinary negligence never includes an intent-then why
must there be a negation of unlawful intent before the homicide may
be excusable,--why at all in the statute of crime exemptions or de-
fenses? The rule is just as clear that a statute of exemption must be as
liberally construed as the penal statute must be strictly construed.
The trial judge and the Supreme Court both held that the death in the
Clemens Case was the result of accident and misfortune.
Our Supreme Court has many times defined the meaning of "acci-
dent. 
'20
An accident may happen from unknown causes or be the unusual
result of a known cause and unexpected to the party, thereby, in legal
parlance, failing to establish the proximate cause.2'
If an accident, though from a known cause but unforeseen, fails to
make out a case of ordinary negligence, then culpable negligence must
be ordinary negligence foreseen, if that is the correct definition then
the death here could not have been the result of an accident or mis-
fortune as the judge found. But he having found it was an accident,
then it was unforeseen-"not the proximate cause." Where is there
then culpable negligence which is ordinary negligence, inclusive of the
doctrine of foreseeing?
"Accident" is the very opposite of "negligence" in law
Special verdicts have been submitted to juries, and where a jury
found that the happening was the result of an accident, there ended
liability
There can be no accident, there can be no misfortune which is mis-
adventure, unless a person proceeds with usual and ordinary caution
and without any unlawful intent. Were an act nialun tn se, it would
not be a lawful act, nor could it be with usual and ordinary caution,
'State v. Blackburn, (Del), 75 Atl. 536.
' Schzneider v. Provwdent Life Ins. Co., 24 Wis. 28.
"Ulniann v. C. & N W R. Co.. 112 Wis. i5o, 88 N.W 4.
122
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but driving in excess of what is provided by statute is merely ialum
prohibitum. It could only become malurn sn se in spite of or without
the statute if the driving were so reckless as almost to amount to wilful-
ness.
The court found that the death was the result of accident. He was
doing a lawful act in driving a machine, and the operation was by
lawful means, statute providing that if death is the result of an accident
and misfortune, regardless of how else it anght happen, then there the
offense ends. Or, if he does a lawful act by lawful means with usual
and ordinary caution, without any unlawful intent, the offense ends.
So it is not sufficient that ordinary caution was lacking, but it must be
without an unlawful intent, before the defense avails him. That is
correct, because when justifiable homicide and excusable homicide were
divided into two sections of our statutes, justifiable homicide never could
be justifiable unless it was without the unlawful intent. To overlook
that slight fault which is excusable, the law forgives the fault if the
intent is not unlawful. The law never forgives the act involved in an
unlawful intent.
And again, in section 3263 R.S., and the meaning of the term
"culpable negligence,"--the word "culpable" can never be given the
meaning of ordinary negligence, because it would be guilty of gross
tautology to say "negligent negligence." If the legislature had intended
the term, "ordinary negligence," it would have used such term, because
4363 R.S. was enacted at the very same time as 4367 R.S.
Webster's dictionary defines "culpable" as "deserving censure or
moral blame, faulty, immoral, criminal," so that while culpable negli-
gence in a civil action might be given the definition of fault, negligence,
or deserving of censure, yet by the well established rule of construc-
tion in a criminal case, that definition most favorable to the accused
must be used. Therefore, of the various synonyms, the one that defines
it as "criminal" is the one that has its proper definition and place. It
is not necessary here to strain a support of the Missouri doctrine, for
even there culpable negligence is the culpable negligence plus the intent.
The cases cited in appellant's brief 51 to 57 are again referred to as the
better and safer doctrine to follow.
16 C. J., page 74.
A crime is not committed if the mind of the person committing the
act is innocent.
To constitute a crime, the act must, except in the case of certain statu-
tory crimes, be accompamed by a criminal intent or by such negligence
or indifference to duty or to consequences as is regarded by the law as
equivalent to a criminal intent.
It must be more than a mere omission of usual and ordinary caution.
If the legislature should adopt the suggestion of the court that the
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law should be amended so as to have reference to only gross negligence.
wilful negligence, or a reckless disregard of human life or an intent to
do harm, then it would write into Section 4363 either murder in the
second degree, or if the intent were clearly established, murder in the
first degree.
To constitute gross negligence in such a case the act or omission
causing the injury must have been wanton or wilful. 22
Wilful misconduct, so coifcurring, does have that effect, such wilful
wrong being what is sometimes referred to as wilful, malicious or
wanton, evincing intention to do an injury to another.23
Section 466o. An indictment for murder must charge wilfully, feloni-
ously and with malice aforethought, killed and murdered, etc.
Wilfulness may tend to establish murder in the first degree, and
wantonness may be so gross as to come within murder in the second
degree.
Sandar's Justiman, page 4or, page 5, discusses "culpa" in the several
degrees, and on page 402,
All responsibility for culpa is thus set under two heads of diligence,
and in the same way there are two corresponding heads of negligence,
and negligence has a distinguishing mark added to it in the term
crassa, as opposed to slight (minima)
There is the distinction between diligence and negligence. Diligence
is the opposite of negligence.
Negligence may be the result of inadvertence, and as diligence has
the element of assiduity or assiduousness, when a man lacks diligence,
it cannot be said that he becomes inadvertent. Even the term "inad-
vertence" must be given its dual scope, depending upon whether the
application is in a criminal or civil case, for inadvertence may be the
result of heedlessness, and inadvertence the result of negligence. Heed-
lessness embodies recklessness, an element of wilful negligence.
Contributory negligence is a defense in a civil case.24
Excusable homicide is a defense in a criminal prosecution..2 5
In a civil action the burden of defense is on the defendant, but in a
criminal action the burden is upon the state to overcome the defense
of excusable homicide, and. since unlawful intent is one of the elements
provided to be overcome, it is fatal to omit it from the consideration
of the jury
Kucthler v. Milwaukee E. R. & L. Co., 157 Wis. 1O7, 146 N.W 1133.
Bolin v. C. St. P M. & 0 R. Co., 1O8 Wis. 333, 84 N.W 446.
" Grim v. Milwaukee Elec. RY & LT Co., 138 Wis. 44, 129 N.W 883.
Sec. 4367, Wis. Stats.
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There is no yardstick by which it may be deterrmned whether any
given action amounts to ordinary care. The decision must, of necessity,
be a matter of human judgment. This is signally true in automobile
accidents.
26
Honest judgment, though. faulty, has never been the subject of
criminal punishment for it is of the essence of innocence.
Mere omission is not the basis for penal action.
Culpable negligence in a criminal case is of different significance.
Culpable negligence will supply criminal intent."
While battery is the carrying out of the intent by the actual infliction
of the injury
And if the injury occasioned by the collision resulted in death, the
culpable driver may be justly convicted of manslaughter if the collision
was caused directly by such gross carelessness as to imply an indiffer-
ence to consequences, or by the commission of an unlawful act.
But the intent may be inferred from circumstances which legitimately
permit it. Intent to injure may not be iplied from a lack of ordinary
care.
It is no defense to a charge of manslaughter for the defendant to
show that, while grossly reckless, he did not actually intend to cause the
death of his victim. In these cases of personal injury there is a con-
structive intention as to the consequences which, entering into the
wilful, intentional act, the law imputes to the offender, and in this way
a charge which otherwise would be mere negligence, becomes by reason
of a reckless disregard of probable consequences, a wilful wrong. That
this constructive intention to do an injury in such cases will be imputed
in the absence of an actual intent to harm a particular person is recog-
nized as an elementary principle in criminal law.2s
The correct rule of what is negligence in a criminal case is stated in
State v Tankersley29 (1916)
The decisions of the courts have described in different terms the
kind of negligence required to constitute crime. In some of them it is
said to be negligence that is culpable and gross. In others that it must
be such as to show a reckless disregard of the safety of others, etc.,
but all of the authorities are agreed that, in order to hold one a criminal,
there must be a higher degree of negligence than is required to estab-
lish negligent default on a mere civil issue, and that, in order to
a conviction of involuntary manslaughter, attributable to a negligent
omission of duty, when engaged in a lawful act, it must be shown that
a homicide was not improbable under all the facts existent at the time
and which should reasonably have an influence and effect on the con-
duct of the person charged. But the omission must be one likely
to cause death.
" Shortl v. Sheill, 172 Wis. 53, 178 N.W 304.
' State v. Irvine, (.a), 52 So. 567-572.
Luther v. State (Ind), 98 N.E. 64T.
'State v. Tankersley, (N.C.), go S.E. 781.
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On the record, therefore, defendant should not be convicted of the
crime of manslaughter because of an utter absence of proot that a
homicide could not have been reasonably expected to follow from any-
thing that he did or omitted to do, and his motion to dismiss the case
against him should have been allowed.
North Carolina Statutes, Section 3622
If any person shall commit the crime of manslaughter he shall be
punished by impnsonment in the County Jail or State Prison not less
than four months nor more than twenty years.
This is the same as our section 8 (page 348) statutes of the Terri-
tory of Wisconsin (1839), before it was subdivided into four degrees.
If the opinion of the Supreme Court stand unreversed, then, a person
who drives an automobile and through inadvertence causes the death of
some one, is, of course, at once arrested and convicted of manslaughter
in the fourth degree. Yet he may escape civil liability on a defense of
contributory negligence.
And, to go a step farther,-if a man is fortunate enough to be able
to employ a chauffeur and the chauffeur through some act of inad-
vertence injures some one and death ensues, the chauffeur goes to prison
as a felon convicted of manslaughter in the fourth degree, while the
owner of the machine escapes civil liability because of contributory
negligence on the part of the person killed, and likewise, if a motorman
in the city of Milwaukee in running his car, through inadvertence,
causes the death of a man, woman or child, the street car company can
successfully plead contributory negligence as a defense, while the motor-
man goes to prison as a felon notwithstanding.
And may not this conclusion be reached? If A should run his auto-
mobile into B through inadvertence, and, if B should die after a year
and one day from the injury, then A would escape prosecution for
manslaughter. And this, too, before he can be convicted of "assault
with intent to do great bodily harm," as by section 4377, which has
always been understood to merge into manslaughter in the event of
death, the element of intent, though not as great as in assault with
intent to kill and murder (section 4373) must be found. But should B
die within the year and one day, then, under the decision, he stands con-
victed of manslaughter though no intent be found.
If that be correct, then the consequence and not the intent controls
the degree of crime. Statutes may be enacted in which from certain
omissions of duty the intent is supplied, BUT none here has been so
enacted in our statutes of manslaughter.
Again, the punishment is meted out to A
First: As a punishment for his crime, but, if he be guilty of man-
slaughter because of accident, misfortune, or inadvertence, then he is
punished not for crime but for negligent conduct.
FELONY-ESCAPE CIVIL LIABILITY?
Second. Punishment is also meted out in order to deter others, a mes-
sage, so to speak, to the community, and the message goes out that
others beware of accident or misfortune. What a wonderful world it
would be if we were free from accident and misfortune.
For fear of being too lengthy, the writer has refrained from quoting
at greater length or entering into what might seem side discussions.
But it seems that in the modern every-day acceptation of the definition
of crime-when we speak of a person having committed a crime, or
being a criminal, with loss of citizenship-and felony means a loss of
citizenship with the person's credibility as a witness forever affected-
there at once comes to the mind of the ordinary person the thought that
that person has some moral delinquency, some deficiency, that he has
done something other than a mere negligent act, a mere omission. It
would be super-refining to fasten guilt upon a person when the element
of accident and misfortune is present and an unlawful intent is not
found, and to thus condemn him because of some slight fault, negligence
or omission, for which the law of excusable homicide was enacted,-
to protect and keep within society those who were, in ancient times,
sent to one of the six cities of refuge.
